Bailing Reflux

I've expressed these beliefs prior but still think they are appropriate now. Especially since the bailing landscape is more barren with the most coveted players having already been dealt.

My problem with bail trades involving contracts is the team that bails should be guaranteed no worse than a tie on the day after the season ends. This is always the case when the bailing team deals out-of-time players for ones who aren't. The usual example would be dealing an out-of-time Pujols for a pick. No matter what happens during the season, the bailing team is better off on Oct 1 with a 2nd rd pick than nothing. But if a bailing team deal out-of-time players for minor leaguers who are subsequently trade prior to the next season, the bailing team is still no worse off on the day after the season ends.

This also helps salve the wounds the other competitors endure when the competitive balance is kicked in the teeth by the bailing team.

Many bailing teams may not see it this way so I will frame it another way.

What occurs when fully-valued players and easy keepers are dealt is the kicked-in-teeth never improve and the bailing team does not automatically break even at season's end. And to make matters worse, the recipeint of the bail trade still has pieces to deal to improve their team for the following season.

What can occur is the bail piece gets hurt or traded out of the league. Here the recipeint gets the best end of the 2005 trade and the best end of the 2006. This should be avoided.

And the competitive balance was still shat all over. In this case the teams competing in 2005 and the bailing team lose.

All this risk is eliminated by not dealing fully-valued players and easy keepers. And the forces of vetoing trades are held at bay.

This expresses my views on my increasingly anti-bail trades position and the insidious influence fo the 5th column, the vetoing trades forces.